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Summary
There is wide interest in, and support for, the idea of
treating water as an economic good. However, the
role of water—as a basic need, a merit good, and a
social, economic, financial, and environmental re-
source—makes the selection of an appropriate set of
prices exceptionally difficult. Further, the application
of price-based instruments, once an appropriate value
system has been agreed, is particularly difficult in the
case of water. This is so because the flow of water
through a basin is complex, and provides wide scope
for externalities, market failure, and high transaction
costs. While judiciously applied market tools can be
expected to have benefits, in many cases the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions, especially defined and
enforced water rights, are not yet in place. Priority at-
tention to these essentials is likely to have high re-
turns; pursuit of economic approaches in the absence
of such preconditions may have unpredictable, and
possible negative effects.1
Water as an Economic Good: A Solution, or a Problem?
C. J. Perry, Michael Rock, and D. Seckler
Introduction
The now famous proclamation that water
should be treated “as an economic good”
originated in the Dublin Conference (ICWE
1992). Like many such proclamations, it has
the virtue of being sufficiently vague to al-
low agreement, while leaving the implied
operational content—over which there may
be strong disagreement—unstated.
The proclamation was a compromise
between those, mainly economists, who
wanted to treat water in the same way as
other private goods, subject to allocation
through competitive market pricing, and
those who wanted to treat water as a basic
human need that should be largely ex-
empted from competitive market pricing
and allocation.
To further complicate matters, there is
an important distinction in economics be-
tween the true “economic” value of a good
and its “financial” value. The two values
rarely correspond, and as will be argued,
for water the divergences are exceptionally
complex and important. Thus it does not
follow from the declaration that water is an
economic good that should be allocated by
competitive market prices that reflect only
financial, not necessarily economic, values.
The question is not whether water is an
economic good or not—it certainly is an
economic good in most cases, like almost
everything else we have to worry about.
Rather the question is whether it is a purely
private good that can reasonably be left to
free market forces, or a public good that
requires some amount of extra-market
management to effectively and efficiently
serve social objectives. The answer to this
question lies not so much in lofty principles
but in value judgments, and their
application to different conditions of time
and place. Thus we find ourselves favoring
the private good side of the argument in
some cases and the public good side in
others. The task is to define precisely what
these cases, value judgments, and specific
conditions of time and place, are. This
definition is, we believe, important for two
reasons: First, dogmatic posturing by the
proponents of each perspective is a waste of
intellectual talent. Second, and more
importantly, water is far too important to its
users to be the basis for socioeconomic
experiments. Much is already known about
the nature of successful policies and
procedures for allocating water; un-
derstanding and incorporating the
implications of this knowledge will avoid
some potentially enormous financial,
economic, environmental, and social costs.2
That water usually is an economic good
follows directly from the definition of
economics as “the science which studies
human behavior as a relationship between
ends and scarce means which have al-
ternative uses” (Robbins 1935). Water meets
these requirements: it serves a multiplicity of
ends (ranging from drinking and bathing,
through irrigation, recreation, and environ-
mental use, to waste disposal), and thus
satisfies the condition of “alternative uses.”
In many cases, water is scarce in the sense
that it cannot fully satisfy all its alter-native
uses simultaneously.
But nearly everything we need to
worry about is “an economic good” in this
sense—that is why we have to worry. With
his definition, Lord Robbins established the
foundations of what has since been de-
scribed as the “Imperial Science” of
economics. But the important question is
not whether water is an economic good or
not, but what kind of economic good it is. We
believe that it is both a public and a private
good. If this is correct then the true
“economic” value of water will differ from
its “financial” value—i.e., the value based
only on market prices—as any competent
economist will recognize. How precisely
will it differ? The answer to this question
lies in two separate but interrelated do-
mains or universes of discourse: values and
facts.
In the debate over water as a private or
public good, the differences between values
and facts are easily defined. First, in terms
of values, the proponents of water as a
private good contend that water is just like
any other good, that its production allo-
cation should be determined by the
overriding value of consumer’s sovereignty—
i.e., by the amount that people are “ready,
willing, and able to pay” for it. The
criterion of consumer’s sovereignty totally
ignores the distribution of income in society.
If the poor cannot pay as much for a unit of
water as the rich they should get less water,
even if the marginal value to them in terms
of other values (or utility) is greater.
This is what the proponents of water as
a public good object to. They contend that
safe water is a basic need that should be
available at reasonable levels to everyone.
They also contend that water used for irri-
gation can be a powerful means of reducing
food costs to poor people and, under the
proper conditions, should be subsidized
(Chambers 1988). Others believe that water
serves important ecological, environmental,
and aesthetic benefits in many cases, and
should not be allocated to other uses simply
on grounds of willingness to pay. In the
terminology of economics, this school
believes that, at least up to some minimal
level of availability, water is a social good
whose availability to certain groups and for
certain purposes at well below market
prices will serve the greater benefit of
society as a whole. Similarly, narcotics,
tobacco, and alcohol are “unsocial” goods,
priced (or controlled) at levels well in
excess of the prices that would prevail in a
free market.
But even in these cases of conflicts over
values, rational people can reach agreement
in terms of relative quantities. No one
would deny provision of safe drinking
water to a poverty-stricken village that
could not pay full costs, or advocate drain-
ing wetlands so that water could be
obtained for swimming pools and golf
courses. On the other hand, most advocates
of water as a public good would agree that
after a basic level of service—of drinking
water, for example—is attained, additional
supplies could properly be allocated by
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market forces. Or, in the case of food, once
a nation achieves a certain level of pros-
perity, market forces supplemented by
directed poverty alleviation programs may
be more efficient ways to help poor people
than general subsidies on food. Conflicts
over values often depend on situation-
specific facts. Unfortunately, dogmatists
often control the discussion simply by
virtue of their very single-mindedness.
However, even if everyone agrees on
values, there can be rational disagreements
on facts. This occurs, for example, in the
case of “market failure,” discussed below.
Even if everyone would agree that con-
sumer’s sovereignty should rule as the sole
value, there are several well-known con-
ditions under which the free market will
fail to effectively and efficiently serve this
value. In these cases, various kinds and
degrees of government intervention or other
kinds of collective intervention, or both, are
required to make the market perform
effectively to serve the value of consumer’s
sovereignty.
In sum, water serves many different
objectives and has properties that make it
both a private and a public good. The
appropriate blend of values and facts in
proper policy formulation for water re-
quires a much more sophisticated form of
analysis than that allowed by the sim-
pleminded dogmatism of proponents, either
of basic needs or of free markets. Water
policy must be formulated in terms of
multi-objective decision making, recog-
nizing that the relevance and importance of
various values and facts will vary sub-
stantially over different conditions of time
and place.
In the following pages we address the
question: what does it mean to treat water
in irrigated agriculture as an economic
good? We focus on irrigated agriculture for
several reasons. First, it is the largest con-
sumer of water virtually everywhere that
irrigation is practiced. Second, policies gov-
erning water use in irrigated agriculture are
fraught with disagreements over both val-
ues (should it be treated as a purely private
good, a public good, or a basic human
need) and facts (what is the most cost-effec-
tive allocation policy and method if water is
treated as a purely private good, or a pub-
lic good, and in what instances should it be
treated in one way rather than in the other).
The argument proceeds in three steps.
First, we examine the economic analysis of
different values involved in treating water
as a private and public good. Then the facts
involved in this debate in terms of the
causes of both market failure and public
failure are examined. Finally, we examine
alternative ways out of the dilemma posed
by these two forms of institutional failure
and suggest a practical plan of action.
The Economic Analysis of Different Values
The difference that different values can
make to the interpretation of the same facts
may be illustrated from an interesting, pro-
market paper by Briscoe (1996). Since
Briscoe presents the basic economics needed
for both sides of the discussion in a clear
and simple way, this part of his paper is
quoted below at considerable length.
The idea of “water as an economic good”
is simple. Like any other good, water has a
value to users, who are willing to pay for it.4
Like any other good, consumers will use water
so long as the benefits from the use of an
additional cubic meter exceed the costs so
incurred. This is illustrated graphically in
figure (a), which shows that the optimal
consumption is X*. Figure (b) shows that if a
consumer is charged a price P’, which is
different from the marginal cost of supply, then
the consumer will not consume X* but X’. The
increase in costs (the area under the cost curve)
exceeds the increase in benefits (the area under
the benefit curve) and there is a corresponding
loss of net benefits (called the “deadweight
loss”).
But what about groups of users, and how is
welfare maximized for the group (or society) as
a whole? The simple logic of figure 1 applies in
the aggregate—for society as a whole, and
welfare is maximized when:
• water is priced at its marginal cost, and
• water is used until the marginal cost is
equal to the marginal benefit.
So far so good, but what actually do we
mean by “benefits” and “costs,” how are these
dealt with in different water-using sectors, and
what are the implications?
Briscoe directly answers this question:
“The value of water to a user is the maxi-
mum amount the user would be willing to
pay for the use of the resource.” But those
who believe that water is a social good
would say that this is an incomplete and
misleading economic analysis. Willingness
to pay depends largely on the ability to pay.
Thus even with the same basic need for or
value of water, the rich will get more and
the poor less. Thus the people between X*
and X
1 are priced out of the market for wa-
ter—if not completely, then in terms of mar-
ginal reductions in the amount they can af-
ford. Thus, the higher the price, the greater
the incidence of poverty in X.
In an enlightened humane society, well-
to-do taxpayers want to help the poor ob-
tain basic needs. Thus, in terms of figure 1,
tax-payers are willing to subsidize water,
effectively shifting the supply curve down
to the point where it intersects the demand
curve at P
1, X
1, and many more poor people
get water. Who is Briscoe, they may say, to
call this humane gesture a “deadweight
loss?” Indeed the real loss to society as a
whole would be to counter social demand
by reducing water availability from X
1 to X*
through competitive prices.
Many economists, and many non-
economists, do not seem to understand that
consumer’s sovereignty is just another
value judgment, like any other value
FIGURE 1.
Optimal consumption and “deadweight losses” if water is underpriced.5
judgment. Thus Briscoe can say that the
value of water is measured by willingness
to pay only if consumer’s sovereignty is
assumed to be the appropriate value sys-
tem. However, if this problem can be
resolved, economic analysis can help in
sorting out the basic issues more precisely
by analyzing different values in terms of
their marginal, rather than their total, value.
Indeed, a controversy over the value of
water at least indirectly led to the develop-
ment of marginal analysis (Barkley and
Seckler 1972), which is one of the two or
three most important concepts in econom-
ics. Markets reflect marginal values, and
function best where such values are
relatively stable, or change progressively.
Water is not such a good.
In some cases, the marginal utility of
water is essentially infinite (or very high)
for all practical purposes—for example, in a
drought, when people are dying of thirst, or
when a reservoir runs dry at the end of the
season after all inputs have been provided
except the last irrigation turn. Conversely,
once a person (or a crop) receives enough
water sufficient to alleviate physical stress
and strain, the utility of additional units
rapidly plummets and can even become
negative.
A case can be made that in such ex-
treme instances, water, as other basic hu-
man needs, ceases to be an economic good
under Robbins’ definition. The condition of
alternative uses implies alternative ends.
When there is only one end to which all of
the resource (and all other resources) would
be applied under conditions of extreme
scarcity, there is only one option and only
one choice to be made—get the water or
die, which closes all options. In any case,
under the welfare criterion of “expanded
choice,” a minimum condition for an eco-
nomic good would be two choices (other
than death, which eliminates the dynamic
choice set). Humans are choosing-animals,
and if they have no choices, they are forced
to live at a subhuman level.
Recognizing this fact, humane societies
attempt to protect their citizens against in-
human situations (Serageldin 1996). Civi-
lized societies provide basic rights protect-
ing citizens against murder, imprisonment
without trial, torture, and even indentured
servitude. And, for the same reason, hu-
mane societies attempt to assure their citi-
zens with a minimum supply of basic
needs—starting with water, food, shelter,
and medical care. Humane societies also
accept responsibility for providing minimal
levels of education and employment oppor-
tunities to their citizens. This distinction is
recognized in economics as the difference
between ordinary goods (including ser-
vices), “merit goods,” which people should
be encouraged and helped to consume, and
“demerit goods,” like drugs, which they
should be discouraged or prevented from
consuming. Underlying these distinctions is
the value of expanded choice: will con-
sumption of this particular good now ex-
pand, contract, or not affect the future set of
choices? The extent to which humane soci-
eties can actually achieve these goals, and at
what levels depends on their judgments of
where the marginal utility curves become
too steep and their resource costs too dear.
On the fringes of these marginal curves,
there is room for debate over values among
proponents of the humane society. But few
would argue that people below the poverty
line in India, where the poor spend 80 per-
cent of their income just to satisfy minimum
nutritional calorie and protein requirements,
are in a satisfactory state. Nor would any-
one deny that substantially reducing the
percentage of people in this miserable situ-
ation in India, China, Indonesia, and many
other developing countries is one of the sig-
nal accomplishments of this century.6
Water also fulfills the criteria for being
considered a merit good: access to clean
water for washing and personal hygiene
has health benefits (reduced incapacity for
work; reduced medical costs) that generally
exceed the cost of providing the water.
But most proponents of the humane
society are also willing to accept the rule of
consumer’s sovereignty, to switch govern-
ing value judgments, once the margin of
basic needs has been satisfied. In other
words, it is an obligation of humane
societies to assure reasonable levels of
water, food, shelter, and medical care to
assure that basic human needs are met. But
it is not reasonable to assist individuals or
families in the acquisition of goods beyond
this level. This is tantamount to arguing
that the same goods should be treated
differently at different levels of con-
sumption. There are clear implications of
this for water, including irrigation water.
Supplies of water at a level of basic needs is
an obligation of humane societies to
provide irrespective of the ability to pay. At
a higher level of supply, lower on the
marginal utility curve, society has little or
no interest at all and consumer’s sov-
ereignty should rule. Needless to say, both
of these statements are, of course, based on
value judgments.
It may also be noted that in the eco-
nomic evaluation of projects, the poor are
discriminated against since they are not
able to pay as much as the rich. One ap-
proach to this problem is to evaluate
projects that help the poor on the basis of
what they would be willing to pay if they
were, say, middle-income consumers.
In sum, depending on the quantities
supplied to individuals, water can be either
a basic human need, a merit good, or an
ordinary private good; it can best be allo-
cated by the public sector or by the private
sector depending on these quantities. This is
an important example of how a fundamen-
tal conflict of values can be potentially re-
solved by facts—indeed, quantitatively!
Facts: Public Failure and Market Failure
Given the generally dismal record of the
public sector in this field, one must sympa-
thize with anyone who is interested in alter-
native institutional arrangements for water
management. Many have understandably
turned to economic instruments, market
systems, and prices as an alternative on the
persuasive grounds that the market works
so spectacularly well in a host of other areas
of economic activity. But even if one accepts
the value of consumer’s sovereignty with-
out qualification, water is unfortunately a
field beset with the classic problems of mar-
ket failure. In this section, we first examine
the rationale for privatization, the ap-
proaches that can be followed, and their
appropriateness. We then turn to the ques-
tion of market failure—a critical problem in
the debate about the role of economic in-
struments in the management of water re-
sources.
Privatizing irrigation systems
In the public sector truly, “the road to hell is
paved with good intentions.” While there
are some notable exceptions to the rule, the
public sector has generally performed mis-
erably in all forms of water management—7
whether in irrigation, or in domestic and
industrial water supplies, or in protecting
resources and environmental quality. The
book on public failure has not yet been
written in any sense comparable with the
elegance and rigor of the works on market
failure (Pigou 1932; Mishan 1976; Little
1950). But some of the well-known and in-
terrelated ills of the public sector can be
listed readily:
• rent seeking, either economically, in the
form of direct bribes and corruption, or
socio-politically in the form of empire
building, high costs, and excessive sup-
plies (Wade 1982; Repetto 1986)
• the divorce of incentives from perfor-
mance—indeed, sometimes almost an
inverse relationship
• capture of public agencies and funds by
politically powerful interests and their
clients
• administrative operations, “by the
book,” rather than management in
terms of objectives and results
The kinds of perverse behavior that
emanate from public sector entities are
legendary. In irrigation, they create the
notorious head-end-tail-end problem, where
farmers at the heads of the system can take
so much water that they actually reduce
yields through waterlogging, while farmers
at the tails receive only what is left over
and suffer drought damage to their crops.
In domestic water supplies, as Briscoe
(1996) points out, the poor usually subsidize
the rich—in the name of the humane
society! Water projects are subject to
corruption, resulting in massive cost
overruns and windfall gains to favored
clients—even in direct violation of the laws,
even in the USA (Seckler and Young 1978).
The problems with public sector man-
agement and allocation of water have cre-
ated the movement toward privatizing irri-
gation systems (Seckler 1993). Privatization
can take several forms, from turnover of
operation and maintenance to farmer asso-
ciations, to volumetric or quasi-volumetric
pricing at the farm level, to development of
water markets and tradable water rights
1
that would allow water to flow to the high-
est-value uses. In each case, the aim of
privatization is simple—to institutionalize a
mechanism for the management and alloca-
tion of water that approximates a conven-
tional market, including a direct relation-
ship between service provided and charges
for water that approaches marginal costs,
and to a mechanism for (re)allocating water
from lower- to higher-value uses.
But which kind of privatization works
best in what circumstance? In terms of val-
ues, many people would agree that the
privatization route should be an approach
or a combination of approaches that satis-
fies basic needs criteria and then optimizes
economic returns to water in terms of con-
sumer’s sovereignty. But this answer just
requires us to ask another question: What
do we know about the marginal benefits
and marginal costs of privatization? The
answer is some, but not nearly enough. An-
swering this question is therefore an impor-
tant part of a research program that concen-
trates on the analysis and quantification of
benefits and costs in the following circum-
stances.
Turnover
The benefits of turnover are expected to in-
clude impacts on productivity and equity,
gains from freeing up of government re-
sources for use elsewhere, and more effi-
cient operation and maintenance (O&M).
1We differentiate delib-
erately, though there are
areas of overlap, be-
tween water markets
and tradable water
rights. The latter re-
quires both the formal
definition of entitle-
ments, and the specifica-
tion of the conditions
under which the entitle-
ment may be traded.
Water markets, on the
other hand, have devel-
oped widely, for ex-
ample in areas where
private tube wells pro-
vide competitive ser-
vices to numerous
potential buyers, in the
absence of the formal
definition of water
rights, tradable or other-
wise.8
The costs of turnover include organizational
and transaction costs, including labor earn-
ings foregone by farmers who participate,
and those costs associated with overcoming
collective action problems. Those in favor of
privatization expect that the benefits out-
weigh organizational and transaction costs
and that turnover is more cost-effective than
simple user charges tied to services pro-
vided by a public sector irrigation agency.
The evidence to date (Vermillion 1996)
is mixed; there are undoubtedly cases
where the projected impacts (especially, re-
ductions in government spending) have
been achieved. There are also cases of fail-
ure and reduced performance. Success or
failure seems to depend more on the qual-
ity and commitment of the implementing
agencies and local leadership factors in the
process of turnover than on the nature of
turnover itself.
Service-related user charges
User charges link use benefits to service de-
livery costs. This contributes to cost recov-
ery and may also provide incentives for
improved irrigation services with attendant
effects on productivity, equity, and effi-
ciency of resource use. Many services (elec-
tricity, telephone, buses, etc.) link the charge
to the level of service (kilowatt-hours, call-
distance-minutes, distance traveled). The
simplest measure of service corresponds to
the volume of water delivered to irrigation
users, but capturing the potential benefits of
service-related charges will often require
differentiated charges. For example, where
drinking water is supplied through irriga-
tion canals, the level of service is usually far
superior to that offered to agricultural us-
ers—priority allocations in times of
drought, and regular deliveries at times of
low or zero irrigation demand. This en-
hanced level of service has attendant
costs—losses are a far higher proportion of
deliveries at low flow rates, and so on. Thus
well-defined service-related charges would
differentiate sharply among users.
Volumetric pricing
The potential benefits of volumetric pricing
or quasi-volumetric pricing (achieved, for
example, by a crop tax related to consump-
tive use) are obvious. This is the most forth-
right way to link water use benefits with
costs and the value of services provided. By
setting volumetric prices equal to opportu-
nity costs, water is efficiently allocated, static
allocative efficiency gains are reaped, and
deadweight losses are avoided. Because wa-
ter rents are captured through such pricing,
losses associated with rent-seeking are also
avoided. The costs of volumetric pricing in-
clude the capital, administrative, and insti-
tutional costs associated with volumetric
metering, billing, and collections of water
charges at the farm level (Perry 1995).
Water markets
Water markets most commonly operate lo-
cally to allow agricultural water suppliers
and consumers to include the opportunity
cost of water in their management deci-
sions. Usually, this involves trading water
among similar uses (for example, the sale or
exchange of irrigation ‘turns’ in a rotational
system), or sale of water by the owner of a
tube well to nearby farmers. The price gov-
erning in such local markets encourages di-
version to higher-value uses. It should be
noted that water markets can coexist with
extreme levels of subsidy—for example
where there is no charge for the irrigation
water that farmers trade, or where there is9
subsidized power supply to the wells that
provide water to local farmers. The costs
associated with water markets are those
transaction and physical system costs neces-
sary for water markets to efficiently operate.
Tradable water rights
Tradable water rights allow the formal
transfer of water entitlements among users,
and as such are more likely to involve inter-
sectoral transfers than the local water mar-
kets described above. While water markets
can function in the absence of formal water
rights, tradable water rights require a much
more specific definition of the entitlement.
As in the case of water markets, while trad-
able water rights are likely to result in (in-
ter-sectoral) reallocation of water from low-
to high-value uses, there is no guarantee, in
the absence of other charging mechanisms,
that the costs of providing the service will
be recovered. (Indeed, the failure to recover
costs simply increases the potential price
and incentive to trade.)
Which of these privatization options is
best? Again there is no simple answer to
this question, but some aspects are clear. An
important size-problem—the small size of
most farms in most irrigation command ar-
eas in developing countries—virtually rules
out volumetric metering at the farm level.
In most instances, the incremental costs of
the infrastructure, management, and admin-
istration required for volumetric metering at
the farm level will exceed marginal ben-
efits—especially where systems have not
been designed and constructed to meet
these objectives. Quasi-pricing schemes
(such as a crop charge linked to evapotrans-
piration) can, to some degree, overcome
these problems. An additional problem in
existing irrigation systems is that the value
of water rights is capitalized in the value of
agricultural land. When water is volumetri-
cally priced by metering or quasi-priced,
full marginal pricing amounts to the expro-
priation of those rights (with consequent
capital losses in irrigated land). Farmers
who have purchased land on the basis of
the accepted, if not legally specified, water
entitlement will strongly oppose this.
In principle, turnover is a desirable op-
tion. It can reduce the financial burden of fi-
nancially strapped public irrigation agencies.
It can provide a locally negotiated basis to
link services to user charges, contributing to
an improvement in the quality of services.
And it can simplify irrigation users’ involve-
ment in investment decisions: Two draw-
backs characterize turnover. First, there is
little evidence that turnover increases pro-
ductivity (Vermillion 1996). Second, there are
serious questions regarding the long-term
sustainability of turned-over systems, be-
cause farmers may not pay their dues and the
dues do not include adequate provision for
replacement of major facilities (Svendsen and
Vermillion 1994). And often the withdrawal
of the government agency leaves important
gaps in oversight areas—overexploitation of
groundwater; pollution of canals, drains, and
aquifers; dam safety; competition among ur-
ban and agricultural demands; and drought
planning. Once these issues are appropriately
addressed, it is not at all clear whether the
benefits of turnover exceed its organizational
and transaction costs.
This leaves water markets. At the local
level of farmers trading small amounts of
water on the watercourse and buying and
selling water from tube wells, water markets
are already thriving in most irrigation sys-
tems and should be encouraged. Water
prices and markets can also serve a valuable
function in larger transfers, whether within
or among sectors under the appropriate con-
ditions, noted before, and with suitable regu-
lation, as discussed in the last section.10
In the following discussion, we shall exam-
ine three of the major causes of market fail-
ure in irrigation and water resource man-
agement, “externalities,” “transaction costs,”
and “property rights.”
Irrigation water and externalities
External effects may be defined as uncom-
pensated costs or benefits incurred by one
party by virtue of the activities of another
party. There are few, if any, economic
activities that have as high an incidence of
external effects, both costs and benefits, as
water.
One of the most important, yet least
appreciated, facts about water is that in a
basin, a substantial amount of it is recycled.
When water is diverted from a stream (or
pumped from groundwater) for use in
agriculture or other activities, some of it is
consumed—for example, through evapo-
ration—and some, returns via drains or
percolation to the stream or aquifer, thus
becoming available for a further cycle of
diversion at another time, another place,
and at another quality. Eventually, as
demand increases, the fresh water available
in a stream is fully utilized—all outflows
are of sufficiently poor quality, or to places
where the cost of recovery is too high, to be
justified for potential uses. Once this
happens a water basin is “closed” and no
usable water supply is left.
The description set out above is highly
simplified but it indicates that if we wish to
privatize the allocation of water, the first
change that needs to be made is to base ac-
counting not for diverted water, but for
consumed water, with additional adjust-
ments for time, location, and quality. An
example should make this clear.
Let us take the case of rice. Rice farm-
ers in Asia and elsewhere use water as a
substitute for labor to control weeds, in ad-
dition to meeting crop water needs. The ef-
fect of this is to dramatically increase the
volume of water applied, but the impact of
this very high application of water on con-
sumptive use of water is minimal. This is
because consumptive use can never exceed
potential evapotranspiration, and as long as
the crop is well watered, crop evapotranspi-
ration will be at or close to its potential.
If water applied is now priced with a
positive marginal cost, farmers will substi-
tute some labor for water and in doing so
reduce the amount of water applied, yield-
ing what looks like real water savings. But
these savings are ultimately illusory as long
as the excess water applied is recycled and
reused. Marginal pricing of water applied
will primarily have accomplished a shift in
the demand for labor. Further, if the “ex-
cess” water applied in one season to the
rice was stored in the aquifer for pumping
and reuse in a drier season, then an external
benefit will have been lost.
The importance of accounting for water
in terms of consumption is well understood
in the western US. There, there is substan-
tial resistance to transfer of water out of ir-
rigation districts because it is realized that
once trading starts all of the secondary ef-
fects of recharging aquifers and recycling
are disturbed.
Because of this problem, some states in
the US now assign property rights on the
basis of consumptive use rather than water
diversions, for purposes of sale and transfer
(Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994). In some
instances, state laws expand this by re-
quiring irrigation districts to document
reductions in consumption at the local level
before water can be traded. While this is a
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step in the right direction, it does not
completely solve the problem of exter-
nalities. If farmers sell the consumptive
use right, they will no longer irrigate.
In this situation, losses in canals will tend to
form a higher proportion of deliveries; the
fixed operating costs of the system must be
borne by fewer users; aquifer recharge is
reduced, and other farmers, who depended
on return flows will have to reduce their
irrigation accordingly. Keeping these
accounts in order presents a major
challenge.
Let us now add some real-world com-
plexities to our simplified distinction be-
tween field-level and basin-level measures
of consumption. The non-consumed fraction
of water applied at the field returns to the
system, but it returns in an altered state.
First, to the extent that the originally di-
verted water contained some salt, the return
flow will have a higher concentration be-
cause plants consume only water. Second,
as a result of the application of fertilizers
and pesticides the return flows may be fur-
ther degraded by pollutants. Third, if the
soil in the irrigated area contained natural
salts, these may also be leached by the re-
turn flows, reducing its quality still further.
Fourth, the return flows may go to a loca-
tion where not all can be recovered—a deep
aquifer, or into a stream below the lowest
diversion structure.
Finally, the return flows may arrive at a
time when water is in temporary excess (di-
versions during the dry season returning
during the rainy season), or vice versa.
Thus setting the appropriate prices may be
seen to be complex, and of course also de-
pendent upon the proposed further use:
farmers may be pleased to receive water
that already contains fertilizers. Barge op-
erators are concerned only about the spe-
cific gravity of the effluent, not its chemical
composition, and so on.
The point of these examples is to dem-
onstrate the need to pay attention to exter-
nal effects in a water basin—that is where
water is going, where it is being consumed,
where it is being reused, and what is hap-
pening to salt and pollution loading, and
the timing and location of return flows as
water is being recycled and reused. These
effects must be regulated to bring private
behavior into accord with social interests
and to achieve an economic optimum. Un-
less this is done, pricing and trading water
will have uncertain impacts on economic,
social, and environmental efficiency.
Privatization in water and
transactions costs
The second efficiency problem associated
with treating irrigation water as an eco-
nomic good relates to transaction costs. In
many irrigation projects, the irrigation infra-
structure—both the physical and manage-
ment infrastructure—required to allow de-
livery of water to serve market purposes—
that is, to price water at its marginal cost—
is entirely absent. Perry (1995) recently cal-
culated the cost of introducing the infra-
structure required to give farm-level mea-
surements of water deliveries in Egypt. By
his estimate, they were such as to more
than offset the benefits that would flow
from being able to set prices closer to mar-
ginal cost. Egypt is not the only example of
this. In the warabandi system of irrigation
widely practiced in India and Pakistan,
while system structure permits trading of
water among farmers within a watercourse,
trading across water courses or between
agricultural and nonagricultural uses out-
side individual water courses would require
substantial physical infrastructure invest-
ments and institutional change. It is doubt-
ful whether the marginal benefits of trading12
across watercourses would justify the in-
vestment in irrigation infrastructure neces-
sary to accommodate it.
For the most part, in the real world,
water is allocated first to municipal and
domestic use, second to industrial and
commercial use, and third to agriculture.
(Environmental allocations are also growing
in volume and priority.) This sequence of
priorities is generally consistent with social
and economic objectives that many would
share; the questions then are what would
the incremental benefit be of fully liberating
the allocation process (with agreed values
structures!), and what would the infra-
structural and transaction costs be.
In the terms of classical economics, one
of the features of the “dead-weight loss”
triangles shown in figure 1 is that, within
sectors they are generally very small in
relation to total benefits or costs (the areas
under the demand and supply curves).
Frustrating as this fact is to market ad-
vocates, it means that one cannot spend
very much to eliminate them. And, in the
case of inter-sectoral transfers, e.g., from
agriculture to domestic or industrial use,
the triangles may be large but the side
effects—in terms of externalities, secondary
benefits, transaction costs, changes in the
physical systems, etc.—will often outweigh
the benefits.
Property rights
The third point that needs to be considered
is that effective water markets and water
pricing are utterly dependent on secure and
effective property rights in water. Yet many
would agree that the single greatest prob-
lem in water resource management in the
developing world is that property rights in
water are very insecure and ineffective. Or
said another way, a central problem of
irrigation performance is the ability of
some farmers to steal water from other
farmers.
This fact has been extensively doc-
umented in numerous studies of irrigation
performance. The most common mani-
festation of it is that farmers at the heads of
irrigation systems usually receive far more
water than they have a right to, while
farmers at the tails receive less. If property
rights in water formally recognize rights to
diversions while denying historical rights to
return flows, as has been done in Mexico
and Chile (Gazmuri and Rosegrant 1994),
they institutionalize theft. The same prob-
lem can occur at the level of entire water
basins, as in Pakistan and Egypt. As
development proceeds upstream, down-
stream users receive progressively less, and
more polluted, water.
Since property rights in water are not,
in this first instance, secure or effective, it is
difficult to see how privatization will
contribute to more efficient allocations of
water use unless substantial efforts (and
costs) are made in advance to establish and
protect property rights.
In countries where water markets and
trading of water have worked beyond the
purely local level, there are in place: laws
assigning rights, laws describing how rights
may be traded; legal systems that enforce
the rights and punish infringements on
those rights; farmers who are accustomed to
working with laws and rules that are
enforced; and a physical irrigation infra-
structure and irrigation management system
capable of allocating water in accordance
with market-friendly principles and the
changing needs and priorities that flow
from these principles. None of this is
characteristic in developing countries—
indeed most lack the first requirement,
water rights—nor is it costless or easy to
establish such frameworks.13
This set of problems, particularly the
problem of governance (and the associated
transaction costs accompanying establishing
good governance), is so apparent to those
who work with irrigation systems in devel-
oping countries that it is difficult to under-
stand why the proponents of privatization
ignore it. Paradoxically, in those countries
where these features are in place, many spe-
cialists are unaware of (or blind to) their
existence. Recently, a study in Germany re-
vealed a vast array of complex rules and
traditions governing the allocation of water,
responsibilities, and costs in a major river
basin, whose management is undertaken
entirely by very old user organizations. Spe-
cialist observers were unaware of their
existence, because they had worked so
smoothly and unobtrusively for so long!
(Wolff and König 1997).
Summing Up
How might these considerations of water as
an economic good affect water policies, par-
ticularly those in irrigated agriculture? It is
important to recognize that much of the dis-
cussion of irrigated agriculture is taking
place under conditions of conflict—where
there is intense disagreement over values,
and facts are unknown. This is what makes
working in water so interesting and excit-
ing.
If basic human needs for safe domestic
water and food produced by irrigation are
to be met in poor countries, some degree of
subsidy may be necessary so that masses of
poor people are not priced out of the mar-
ket. In the case of food, for example, many
Asian countries deliberately created an
“oversupply” of food (in relation to market-
price demand) by subsidizing agriculture,
in particular irrigation investments. This
policy has resulted in dramatic decreases in
the number of abjectly poor farmers and
hungry people in these countries and is one
of the signal accomplishments of human-
kind in all of world history.
At more micro levels—on farmers’
fields, within individual command areas,
and in water basins—externalities can be
internalized by paying close attention to
what is happening to the physical flow of
water: Where is water going? Where is it
being lost? Where is it being consumed?
Where is it being reused? What is happen-
ing to salt and pollution loading? Doing
this requires paying close attention to hy-
drology and integrating the engineering of
water with the economics of water.
We now know that the consequences of
water movement through water basins dif-
fer significantly and that these differences
have important effects on the design of wa-
ter policies. In Egypt, high basin-wide effi-
ciency and low salt loading, mean that in-
vestments to improve local, or classical, ir-
rigation efficiencies, often have low or nega-
tive returns. In Pakistan, high basin effi-
ciency and high salt loading, combined
with recycling and reuse contribute to sig-
nificant salinization and waterlogging.
Here, investments in local irrigation im-
provement projects can yield high returns,
particularly if reductions in the negative
externalities associated with salinization
and waterlogging from over-irrigation are
counted in benefits. We doubt that market-
determined prices offer guidance to an ap-
propriate water allocation strategy in either
of these two cases.
Similar technical and economic prob-
lems confound the wisdom of policy advice14
that fails to take account of the movement
and use of water through a farmer’s field.
For example, it has become fashionable to
advise farmers to shift to wet-seeding of
rice. Adoption of this technology is (from
the farmer’s perspective) a means of saving
labor. It is also seen as a means of reducing
water consumption. Wet-seeding reduces
water diversions, but it may not reduce
consumptive use because the large wetted
area covered by the dry seeding (as com-
pared to rice nurseries) evaporates more
water. In this instance, pricing diverted wa-
ter at marginal cost may actually encourage
a water-inefficient practice (one with higher
evapotranspiration).
Transaction costs can be taken into ac-
count by trying to measure them prior to
making changes in the design, construction,
or management of irrigation systems. This
is likely to be particularly important where
reliance on water markets is being proposed
to improve the economic efficiency of water
use. As we stated earlier, where markets
have worked well, laws assigning rights,
laws describing how rights may be traded,
legal systems that enforce the rights and
punish infringements on those rights, and a
physical irrigation infrastructure and irriga-
tion management system capable of allocat-
ing water in accordance with water markets
all exist. For most of the developing world,
these conditions do not. If they did, stealing
of water from tail enders by head enders
would not be as prevalent as it is—and ex-
isting systems would be managed much
better than they are.
Finally, it is important to take ad-
vantage of opportunities to enhance
efficiency and productivity by not letting
the best be the enemy of the good. This
might require recognizing, for example, that
fixed user fees for operation and main-
tenance costs and public sector manage-
ment may be more efficient than turnover
in many situations, even though turnover is
attractive on other grounds. Or it might
require recognizing the physical limits of
delivery systems, at least in the short run,
that can meet only the simplest of
schedules. If all of these things are done
and done well, we stand a better chance of
meeting our objectives. But if they are not,
or if the current fad or ideology (of getting
prices right in water) replaces a search for
more understanding, we may find ourselves
no better off, or worse off, a decade from
now.
Conclusion: Toward Improved Water Resources Management
A forthcoming study of the “Support Sys-
tems” required for sustainable water
resources management indicates the com-
plexity of the institutional arrangements re-
quired for sustainable, productive water use
(Vissia 1997). The study, of a project in
Colorado in the western USA, also shows
that such arrangements do indeed allow the
rational allocation of water among compet-
ing uses through market mechanisms.
First, Colorado has a strict system of
water rights. These rights are based on the
doctrine of “prior appropriation,” the first
in use, the first in right. Maas and Andersen
(1978) have argued that this system of
rights constitutes an inequitable and ineffi-
cient system of water allocation. Neverthe-
less (and of crucial interest here) the system
is legally enforced and transparent, and
provides all users, favored or otherwise,15
with information for planning their opera-
tions.
Second, while there is an active market
for water in Colorado, transactions are
firmly embedded in a legal and admin-
istrative structure that carefully reg-
ulates external effects. The office of the
State Engineer consists of professional
engineers, hydrologists, and others who
investigate all technical aspects of proposed
new developments and reallocations of
water.
Third, each of the seven water basins in
Colorado has its own specialist Water
Court, which only deals with water issues,
and adjudicates all water disputes. Thus a
person who feels that he or she is to be ad-
versely affected by a water transaction can
lodge a suit in these courts and the court
can draw on the expert advice of the office
of the State Engineer to advise on the facts
of the case.
These few extracts serve to confirm the
complexity of the institutional frameworks
required for sound water resource
management; especially when water
allocation and management are passed from
a centralized bureaucracy to local entities,
with consequent “privatization” of water
resource management. We offer these obser-
vations not to recommend an “American”
approach to water manage-ment, but rather
to highlight the necessary components of
sustainable, productive management.
Absent these basic pre-requisites—the norm
in most developing countries—the more
extreme variants of privatization, such as
full water pricing and unregulated market
allocations, are likely to do more harm than
good.
But our position can be stated more
positively, and to do this we define a neces-
sary and sequential set of preconditions for
the beneficial introduction of market forces
into the allocation of water, namely that:
• the entitlements of all users under all
levels of resource availability are de-
fined and include specified assignments
to social and environmental uses
• infrastructure is in place to deliver the
defined entitlements
• measurement standards are acceptable
to the delivering agency and users
• effective recourse is available to those
who do not receive their entitlements
• reallocations of water can be measured
and delivered, and third-party impacts
(in quality, quantity, time, and place)
can be identified
• effective recourse is available to third
parties affected by changes in use
• users must be legally obligated to pay
defined user fees through effective legal
and policy procedures
• large-scale transfers of water with and
between sectors must be subject to ap-
proval and relevant charges by regula-
tory agencies
With these sequentially interdependent
preconditions in place, we believe that the
privatization of water allocation would
have significant benefits; in their absence
impacts are uncertain. We also believe the
implications of running experiments with
peoples’ livelihoods, especially where water
is involved, to be unacceptable.
Our contention is that development
and the efficient use of water will be better
served by the widespread, indeed universal,
introduction of the necessary underpinnings
and prerequisites to good water manage-
ment (assigned water rights, delivery of a
defined service). With these extraordinarily
difficult steps in place, further pursuit of
market forces in the allocation of water will
be useful.16
Privatizing water, in the sense of giving
farmers—and markets—a greater role in
both the financing and management of
irrigation, is a promising development. Its
major benefits are likely to be more in the
long run than in the short run, by
“inducing technological and institutional
innovations” in irrigation management
(Hayami and Ruttan 1985).
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